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RIGHTS AND DUTIES:
THE ETHICAL OBLIGATION TO SERVE THE POOR
David Fagelson*
I. Introduction
This Essay explains why lawyers have an ethical obligation to
provide pro bono legal services to the poor. Most lawyers ad-
dressing this issue rely on the various state codes, the ABA Model
Code or judicial decisions to explain the nature of this professional
obligation. This approach misconstrues the foundation and force
of ethical obligations which do not derive simply from doctrinal in-
terpretations of professional codes or courts of law. Using the tools
of normative philosophy, this Essay will demonstrate how this
ethical obligation arises based on the status and role of the legal
profession in American society and, indeed, the profession's own
ethical foundations.
Like many of the traditions of the legal profession, the idea of
public service is commonly invoked for disparate and sometimes
contradictory purposes. The notion of serving the public good,
something larger than private self-interest, is at the root of legal
practice, and yet many lawyers have little idea of what it means or
what it requires them to do. Like such abstract principles as pa-
triotism and original intent, public service appears to function
more like a Rorschach of the individual psyche than as a useful
guide to professional behavior. According to some lawyers, public
service entails nothing more than serving the public's stake in jus-
tice by zealously serving their client's interest. Other lawyers, by
contrast, regard their public service obligation as an injunction to
serve the needs of the poor or to defend unpopular causes that are
otherwise unlikely to gain adequate representation.
In fact, both ideas of public service faithfully represent as-
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pects of the lawyer's professional ethical obligations. Indeed,
rather than representing inconsistent visions of the legal profes-
sion, both are actually part of a larger conception of the lawyer's
role. The same principles that require lawyers to serve their ch-
ent's interest, keep their confidences, treat them with candor and
work diligently on their behalf, create a role for lawyers that obh-
gates them to serve the poor, unpopular and under-served causes.
Skepticism about this latter obligation could be motivated by
commercial self-interest. It is equally likely, however, that the dif-
ferent ethical principles that justify the lawyer's role in the system
of justice have not been made explicit. Because of this lack of
clarity, it is not clear that the arguments supporting the profes-
sion's more cherished privileges, such as self-regulation, also gen-
erate obligations to provide pro bono services. This Essay will
flesh out the principles and describe why, taken together, they im-
pose upon the legal profession an ethical obligation to serve the
poor.'
This Essay is, in some respects, agnostic about the definition
of public service. There are numerous defensible conceptions of
public service, although not all of them necessarily trigger a pro-
fessional ethical obligation. Some people view the legal profes-
sional obligation as limited to pro bono service to the poor. Others
regard the needs of justice, and hence, the professional responsi-
bility of lawyers in a much broader sense. This expansive defini-
tion includes such professional endeavors as the representation of
unpopular causes and non-profit community organizations as well
as efforts to improve the administration of justice or achieve law
reform. While this broad definition reflects a commendable con-
cern for some important social goals, the basic professional obliga-
tion discussed here will be the one to serve the poor. Some lawyers
may, and perhaps should, endeavor to engage in the full spectrum
of public service. However, this Essay demonstrates that, at the
very least, lawyers' professional obligation requires lawyers to
serve the poor.
II. The Legal Profession: Its Purpose and Privileges
In 1975, the American Bar Association House of Delegates
considered and amended a resolution recognizing a professional
1. See generally THE LAW FIRM AND THE PUBLIC GOOD (Robert A. Katzmann
ed., 1995) (discussing different conceptions of the public good and the ways in
which a lawyer might serve it).
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obligation to provide public interest legal services to poor clients at
no, or substantially reduced, fees. 2 The amendment changed the
proposal to state that attorneys have a professional responsibility
to serve the poor, rather than an obligation or professional duty to
serve the poor.3 The largely negative response to this proposed
resolution could be categorized in one of two ways. The first objec-
tion focused on the mandatory and, in some views, coercive nature
of the proposal, claiming that it was inconsistent with lawyers'
professional autonomy. The second objection concerned the injus-
tice of placing the burden to serve the poor primarily on lawyers.
Although those who raised the second objection usually conceded
that the poor needed, and perhaps even had a right to legal serv-
ices, most felt it was a social obligation that would be unjust to
foist on the legal profession alone. They argued that poor people
are denied many important things, including food, shelter and
transportation. Yet this denial does not entail any obligation on
the part of farmers, grocers, real estate developers, building con-
tractors or taxi drivers to donate their services. Thus, why should
lawyers be uniquely required to give away their stock-in-trade? 4
Together, these two arguments constitute the main objections
to any notion of professional obligation to serve the poor. While
neither is frivolous, the first can be disposed of more easily than
the second. But before doing so, it is important to consider two
elemental questions. First, what is it that makes lawyers profes-
sionals, and hence, different in some ways from grocers, contrac-
tors and taxi drivers? Second, why does this difference create a
professional obligation to serve the public?
A. The Idea of a Professional Ethic
Before proceeding to these important questions it is neces-
2. See 100 Annual Report of the American Bar Association 684 (1975)
(providing the recommendation of the Special Committee on Public Interest Prac-
tice, as amended and approved by the House of Delegates).
3. See id.
4. The ABA House of Delegates eventually passed a resolution asserting the
"responsibility" of lawyers to provide pro bono services but eliminating any manda-
tory duty to do so. See id. After further debate and revisions this "voluntary re-
sponsibility" was incorporated into Rule 6.1 of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 (1998) [hereinafter
MODEL RULES]. It is unclear from the language to whom this responsibility is
owed, but even if they were identified there could be no remedy. Because Rule 6.1
is viewed as voluntary, there is nothing in the Disciplinary Rules to enforce it. For




sary to address a broader, more fundamental one: Why do we
have legal professional ethics? That is, why do we have a system
of ethics for the legal profession that is different in any way from
the moral principles that guide the rest of our lives? The idea of a
"local" moral code, specific to the legal profession, contradicts most
of the prevailing moral theories of western civilization regarding a
universal morality that applies to everyone based upon some con-
ception of moral truth.5 This is certainly true of religious morality,
but it is also true of the moral theories that are identified with the
American constitutional structure of justice. Immanuel Kant, for
example, thought that the answer to the question, "What ought I
to do" must be answered by the question, "What ought all rational
beings do?"6 Similarly, John Stuart Mill thought that all behavior
ought to be guided by the principle of utility.7 Everyone pursuing
his or her self-interest would create the greatest average happi-
ness for society as a whole.8
How can we justify exemptions from some general theory of
morality? This dilemma is resolved by the concept of role differen-
tiated behavior.9 People enter into relationships with each other
that, when routinized over time, give rise to expectations about
how these individuals ought to behave. When these relationships
are generalized throughout society, they create societal expecta-
tions about how people in a certain role should act. Perhaps the
classic example of role differentiation is parenthood.10 In becom-
ing a parent, one's moral universe is altered. The calculus of re-
spect society expects a parent to show towards people changes.
Rather than showing equal concern towards everyone, parents are
expected, and in some cases obligated, to show special concern to-
wards their own children.
Likewise, the attitude one has towards fellow members of so-
ciety is often defined by this role differentiation. Judges, for ex-
ample, are expected to show equal concern towards each litigant,
while the lawyer is expected to show greater zeal for his or her
5. For a discussion of the structure of role morality, see DAVID LUBAN,
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 128-47 (1988).
6. See IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS (Bobbs-Merrill 1949).
7. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (Parker, Son & Bourn
1863).
8. See id.
9. See Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professional: Some Moral Issues, 5
HUM. RTS. 1, 3 (1975-76).
10. See id. at 4.
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own client. In assuming a role such as a parent, judge or lawyer,
one takes on special responsibilities that alter the moral reckoning
one can make about people who enter that role."
Once a certain role is assumed, one's role-based responsibility
often becomes correlated with role-based privileges. The holder of
such a privilege is entitled to act in a certain way or to be treated
in a particular way that creates obligations on the part of others.
The obligation of others to respect a privilege reduces their rights
and scope of freedom. For instance, when firemen turn on their
sirens to get to a fire, they are entitled to violate the speed limit
and ignore red lights. While motorists and pedestrians generally
have a legal and moral right for others to obey the speed limit and
stop at traffic lights, that right is limited by the entitlement of fire
fighters to speed to a fire. This entitlement creates an obligation
for others to accommodate their passage.
Society only grants these privileges for a social purpose. We
permit firemen to drive fast because we want them to arrive expe-
ditiously at the scene of a fire. The contingent foundation of role
privileges upon the performance of role responsibilities makes
them revocable for dereliction or abuses of privilege. Society
would hardly tolerate a fire engine running through red lights to
rush a pizza back to the station before it got cold. The role privi-
lege is directly correlated with role duties. If the fire department
spent too much time fund raising for charity balls at the expense of
fire prevention, or caused an inordinate number of accidents
rushing to fires, the cost of the role privileges would outweigh the
benefits.
The idea of particular versus universal moral obligations can
pose difficult problems when they conflict, but otherwise there is
nothing unusual or alarming about assigning obligations based on
someone's social role. When these relationships are freely entered
into, no one can complain about the obligations that accompany
them. People are unlikely to view a husband's complaint about the
burdens of fidelity sympathetically given the voluntary nature of
the commitment. Indeed, most lawyers are actually quite comfort-
able with the particular demands of role-morality even when it re-
quires them to violate the dictates of universal morality. The gen-
eral justification for following the norms of the legal profession
11. See generally ALAN GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS 34 (1980) (arguing that judges, prosecutors and other law enforcement offi-
cials "have a moral duty to accept these institutional obligations even at the ex-
pense of seemingly more important moral rights of others").
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when they conflict with common morality is that doing so serves
some other social value that is highly prized. So too, for example,
a physician may sometimes lie to a patient about an illness if tell-
ing the truth would endanger his or her health.
The role-morality of professional behavior occasionally re-
quires each professional to pursue his or her own assigned social
goal at the expense of other goals and, indeed, general morality.
The social goal assigned to lawyers is, of course, to promote justice.
Within the context of the adversary system, this role-morality en-
tails some peculiar behavior that is clearly inconsistent with com-
mon morality. For instance, under the ethical norms of the legal
profession, a lawyer is supposed to protect the legal interests of the
client zealously. In a criminal trial this means that a lawyer must
keep confidential a client's admission of guilt. Under common mo-
rality, if the same client told an ordinary citizen of his or her
crime, that person would plausibly be under a moral duty to report
it to the police. This is one of the many direct conflicts between
the common morality of the ordinary citizen and the role-morality
of the practicing lawyer.
To the ordinary citizen, the role-morality of the legal profes-
sion casts it and its practitioners in disrepute. 12 Unlike most peo-
ple who judge the moral goals of a person before deciding whether
or not to assist in his or her aims, the role-morality of lawyers in-
structs them to ignore these factors and consider only whether the
person has any legal rights to be asserted or defended. The stan-
dard conception of the lawyer's role is that, within the confines of
the law and professional behavior, one must increase the likeli-
hood that the client will prevail. That the client's moral position is
unsavory is irrelevant so long as he has a legal claim to pursue.
Zabella v. Pakel13 demonstrates this concept. In this case, the role-
morality of the lawyer required him to help defeat a debt claim
against his wealthy client by asserting the statute of limitations as
a defense. Although the lawyer could have believed that his client
misled the plaintiff, an old friend and former employee, by prom-
ising to pay the debt at a future time, the lawyer still had a duty to
assert the defense on behalf of his client.1 4
The standard conception of law operates under a principle of
12. See generally Wasserstrom, supra note 9, at 2 (stating that an attorney's
world is often amoral and sometimes immoral).
13. 242 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1957).
14. See id. at 455.
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non-accountability. 15 The result is that a lawyer is not held ac-
countable for the moral failures of the client. This is possible be-
cause the lawyer's role is to serve justice, which is accomplished by
ensuring that people have the opportunity to assert their legal
rights in court. This larger social value justifies a criminal defense
lawyer putting a prevaricating client on the stand or discrediting a
truthful witness. 16 Some lawyers might find their assigned role-
morality to be repugnant. However, these lawyers would never be
excused from their professional obligations simply because they
fell more heavily on members of the legal profession. Indeed, it is
precisely because of the lawyer's social role that the obligations fall
only on him.
Charles Fried, the former solicitor general, has attempted to
defend the detached moral position of the legal professional while
also denying any professional obligation to donate voluntary serv-
ices. 17 Fried defends the particularistic ethics of legal profession-
als based on their social role of defending rights and promoting
justice. 18 He analogizes the role of a lawyer to that of a friend. 19
The lawyer is obligated to help the friend in certain ways even
though the lawyer may disagree with that friend's goals. A lawyer
representing a corrupt client still acts morally, according to Fried,
because the lawyer's professional purpose is to preserve and ex-
15. See LUBAN, supra note 5, at 7 (citing Murray L. Schwartz, The Profession-
alism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 669, 673 (1978)). See gener-
ally GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 77-125 (4th ed.
1854) (outlining the requirements and importance of a lawyer's fidelity to his or
her client even when the client's interests conflict with the lawyer's own sense of
morality).
16. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 48-
49 (1975) (noting that vigorous cross-examination of mistaken or even truthful
witnesses is necessary to represent clients best).
17. See Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the
Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1079 (1976) ("If there are really not
enough lawyers to care for the needs of the poor, then it is grossly unfair to con-
script the legal profession to fill those needs."). But see Gerald Postema, Moral
Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63, 64 (1980) (proposing
that the Code of Professional Responsibility's "present conception of the lawyer's
role ... must be abandoned, to be replaced by a conception that better allows the
lawyer to bring his full moral sensibilities to play in his professional role").
18. See generally Fried, supra note 17, at 1088 ("It would be absurd to contend
that the lawyer must abstain from giving advice that takes account of the client's
moral duties and his presumed desire to fulfill them. Indeed, in these situations
the lawyer experiences the very special satisfaction of assisting the client not only
to realize his autonomy within the law, but also to realize his status as a moral
being.").
19. See id. at 1067.
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press the autonomy of his or her client in the legal system. 20 That
is, if the client has any rights to assert, the professional duty of the
lawyer is to promote the due process of everyone by bringing these
claims on the client's behalf. Although the lawyer may reject the
client's goals, rights are violated and a wrong occurs when an indi-
vidual refrains from pursuing a lawful claim due to ignorance or
misinformation about the law.
Fried gives a fairly persuasive justification for the particu-
laristic morality imposed on a lawyer as a result of the role as-
signed to his or her profession. Because of the duty to promote
justice and to ensure that people's rights are protected, sometimes
lawyers must associate themselves with people and causes that
repel them and take actions that, in a different context, would be
immoral.2 1 Fried, however, abandons this role-morality when he
confronts the idea of serving the needy.22 He forsakes the lawyer's
professional obligation to promote due process, contending that it
is society's duty to protect the poor. 23 He justifies this inconsis-
tency on the basis of preserving lawyers' autonomy, but his de-
fense of this principle is unsatisfactory. He tells us that, just as
autonomy allows a person to choose a profession, it also leaves
people inside the profession the freedom to organize their practice
according to their own inclination. 24 However, the choices people
make constrain their freedom, and Fried fails to recognize that
those choosing to practice law are required to follow the obliga-
tions imposed on the profession by its role morality.
Fried's argument misses its mark. The lawyer's claim to
autonomy is derived from the need to serve the public interest. If
the constraints of the adversary system suggested that less auton-
omy were more appropriate, the legal profession would have no
more claim to autonomy than an oil company would have if it re-
quested freedom from environmental regulations. Since the law-
yer's professional autonomy is defensible only as long as it serves
the public interest, to permit the legal profession to use its tradi-
tion of independence as a lever against the client's interest would
turn the principle on its head.
20. See id. at 1074.
21. See id. at 1082-87 (discussing the difficult situation where, although a law-
yer must act against her personal integrity, she encounters no legal or professional
sanctions for doing so).
22. See id. at 1079.
23. See id. ("[T]he duty to the client who cannot afford representation is ini-
tially a duty of society, not of the individual lawyer.").
24. See id. at 1078.
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Does the autonomy to decline service to needy clients further
the public interest? Autonomy enables lawyers to distance them-
selves from causes they detest. Some people argue that just as no
one would choose a friend whose goals they reject, lawyers should
not have to represent clients whose values they abhor. However,
this argument is contrary to the code of professional conduct.
Many lawyers throughout history, including Fried himself,25 have
defended the representation of unsavory clients on the principle
that anyone who has rights to vindicate deserves legal counsel de-
spite their moral failures. Indeed, the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct explicitly disassociates a lawyer from the moral views of
his or her client 26 specifically so people with unpopular positions
and causes can gain access to lawyers in our legal system. For
lawyers to raise this issue with respect to the obligation to serve
the poor, while vigorously defending the right to represent disa-
greeable paying clients, implies that they might be willing to asso-
ciate themselves with unsavory causes only if the price is right.
That insinuation is completely contrary to the lawyer's profes-
sional responsibility.27
It should now be clear that role differentiation accords spe-
cific privileges and imposes correlative responsibilities that
thereby alter the ethical standard for people in that role. To ap-
preciate the specific ethical responsibilities of attorneys, it is nec-
essary to consider the role they play in advancing the goals of the
profession, of professionalism generally and of society as a whole.
Understanding the way in which these responsibilities bridge the
different goals will help clarify their scope and content.
25. See id. at 1080 ("If the legal system is itself sensitive to moral claims, sen-
sitive to the rights of individuals, it must at times allow that autonomy to be exer-
cised in ways that do not further the public interest.").
26. Rule 1.2(b) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct states: "A lawyer's
representation of a client, including representation by appointment, does not con-
stitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or
activities." MODEL RULES, supra note 4, Rule 1.2(b) (1998). For a full discussion of
the ways in which unpopular causes have gone unrepresented in our legal system,
see JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
MODERN AMERICA (1976). See generally LAWYERS' ETHICS vii (Allan Gerson ed.
1980) ("This book hopes to provide a clearer understanding of the role of lawyers in
America today and of some of the major ethical problems they must confront.").
27. See generally Michael D. Bayles, A Problem of Clean Hands: Refusal to
Provide Professional Services, 5 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 165, 166 (1979); Michael
Davis, The Right to Refuse a Case, ETHICS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 441, 454
(1986) (commenting that a lawyer's sole act of supplying legal services, even in a
just system of law, is not sufficient to counterbalance the "bad" that the profession
allows him to do).
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B. Professionalism and Responsibility
What is a professional, and what attributes distinguish this
status from other groups? While no uniform definition of profes-
sionalism exists, it is necessary to identify some salient features to
understand what ethical standards should pertain to it.
One characteristic of professionalism is money.28 Since the
advent of the world's oldest profession, the idea of professionalism
has embraced the notion of pay for services rendered. This ele-
ment of professionalism survives intact in our present distinction
between amateurs and professionals. For example, a professional
golfer, unlike an amateur, is paid for his or her performance.
While some may regard this distinction as the crux of profession-
alism, this trait fails to capture the full scope of the concept. In-
deed, standing alone, the idea of making money appears closer to
the idea of commercialism than professionalism.
The extensive training required to practice in the field illus-
trates another important attribute of professionalism. However,
training is insufficient to justify professional status since chess
champions must also train for extended periods, and they have no
right to exclude or certify others before they can play. The intel-
lectual component of the social practice is another aspect of profes-
sionalism. 29 This generalization is also over-inclusive because po-
etry involves intellectual rigor while poets do not generally enjoy
professional status. Another common, and perhaps cardinal, trait
of professionalism is credentialing. Lawyers and doctors, for ex-
ample, must receive a license to practice. This requirement ex-
cludes any uncertified person from engaging in the professional
practice. In addition, the authority of professional memberships to
organize and regulate themselves constitutes a considerable area
of sovereignty.30 This independence is further augmented by the
autonomy of its membership over its own work.
The parameters of a professional's autonomy certainly in-
clude the discretion of the professional to judge how the service
ought to be provided.31 When the boundaries of this autonomy are
28. See Bernard Barber, Some Problems in the Sociology of the Professions, 92
DAEDULUS 647, 673 (1963).
29. See Bayles, supra note 27, at 7.
30. See Barber, supra note 28, at 679.
31. The importance of this type of autonomy as a feature of professionalism is
highlighted by the strongly negative reaction of doctors and patients alike to the
practice of HMO administrators telling doctors how to treat patients based on re-
sources rather than medical criteria. For a discussion regarding the concept of a
profession, see Barber, supra note 28, at 669-88.
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extended, things become more ambiguous. While no one would
presume to tell a kidney specialist how to conduct a dialysis or an
architect how to design a building, society often imposes con-
straints on whether resources ought to be allocated to kidney dis-
eases or whether any more skyscrapers may disfigure the skyline.
This permissible constraint suggests something important about
the nature and role of professions: they are designed and organ-
ized to serve some vital social interest. It seems unnecessary to
state this explicitly, since the need for such things as health care
and legal representation seems so obvious that no one would deny
their value. But it is important to focus on this to appreciate the
trade-off societies make in order to meet these social needs most
effectively.
Society delegates the activities of professionals to specific
groups. Indeed, not only does society entrust responsibilities to a
specific group, society also provides that group with significant
monopoly control over the parameters of the services and member-
ship in its ranks.32 The state further aids this group by making it
a crime to practice certain professions without a license. 33 Hence,
any member of society who wants to enjoy a crucial social service
such as health care or legal representation must seek the assis-
tance of the state designated group. In addition to serving basic
social values and enjoying a monopoly right to do so, professions
are also self-regulating. This autonomy is anomolous. Unlike
other types of monopolistic organizations that are tolerated in the
United States, professions have not been subjected to public con-
trol. Monopolies such as public utilities that also provide essential
public services invite strict government regulation.
Professionals claim that, due to the intellectual training and
autonomous judgment required for their practices, no one else
would be qualified to control or discipline the membership or to set
the conditions of practice. This argument has largely been ac-
cepted. Nevertheless, these combined features of a professional
entity-serving basic social values, having a monopoly, and self-
regulation-can have deeply adverse effects on society and the
quality of human life. The state tolerates this powerful and profit-
able coalition because doing so serves the larger interests of soci-
32. See Bayles, supra note 27, at 11.
33. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 43-9-19 (1998) (practicing chiropractor without a
license is guilty of a felony); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-7001 (1997) (finding the practice
of technical professionals without licenses unlawful); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
524.130(1) (Michie 1996) (practicing law without a license is unlawful).
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ety. However, these monopolies are the state's creation, made for
society's benefit, not for the benefit of professional practitioners. If
they fail to serve society's interest, as society defines it, they un-
dermine the justification for their special privileges.
Now we can see why the initial conception of a profession as
an organization designated to make money offended our sensitivi-
ties. This free market notion fails to convey the image that law-
yers perceive of themselves. More importantly, professionalism
entails social responsibilities that purely commercial enterprises
do not require. The prior discussion has suggested the origin of
this responsibility, which can now be distilled to roughly three
steps. The first stage consists of a claim to maximal competence, in
which practitioners within a favored group, by virtue of their
knowledge and skill, claim to speak for the whole group. 34 Those
outside the group lack the special knowledge necessary to judge
this competence, which leads to public acceptance of the profes-
sion's claim to select, certify and judge members of this class.3 5
In the second stage, professionals must give something in re-
turn for the autonomy granted by society to pursue its important
social purpose. This results in a public commitment by the profes-
sionals to use their skills to realize the important social value in-
herent in their social practice.3 6 Hence, lawyers must commit
themselves to use their special knowledge and skills in the adver-
sarial system, which is vital to the achievement of justice, in a
manner that achieves that important social goal.
The recognition of this responsibility has been articulated for
as long as lawyers have been organizing themselves into profes-
sional associations. At the first meeting of the New York City Bar
Association, Samuel Tilden warned against viewing law simply as
another way of making money and noted that the reasons for or-
ganizing into a professional body were to elevate the organization's
standards and to serve a higher public good.37 This warning rec-
ognizes that the legal profession is more than a commercial enter-
prise engaged in trade. The American Bar Association's Model
Rules of Professional Conduct reiterate this professional commit-
ment to the higher goal of justice, stating: "Lawyers play a vital
role in the preservation of society. The fulfillment of this role re-
34. See KENNETH KIPNIS, LEGAL ETHICS 8 (1986).
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See F. RAYMOND MARKS ET AL., THE LAWYER, THE PUBLIC, AND PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 13 (1972).
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quires an understanding by lawyers of their relationship to our le-
gal system."38
The upshot of the claim to maximal competence and the
commitment to public service results in the third stage of profes-
sionalization: the exclusive reliance by society on licensed attor-
neys as the overseers of the justice system.3 9 If lawyers are seen
as the most qualified to ensure the correct functioning of the judi-
cial system, and if they are committed to using their skills in the
public interest, then society will entrust them with exclusive con-
trol over the system. Here the profession gains in both autonomy
and exclusivity. It takes control of selecting and accrediting can-
didates, and promulgating and enforcing ethical standards.40 Con-
currently, the unauthorized practice of law by outsiders becomes a
criminal offense. 41 In short, the profession becomes an unregu-
lated legal monopoly with respect to legal services. 42 The indis-
pensable relationship between professional autonomy and public
service is explicitly acknowledged in the preamble to the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct:
To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their pro-
fessional calling, the occasion for government regulation is ob-
viated. Self-regulation also helps maintain the legal profes-
sion's independence from government domination. An
independent legal profession is an important force in pre-
serving government under law, for abuse of legal authority is
more readily challenged by a profession whose members are
not dependent on government for the right to practice.
43
The legal profession's relative autonomy carries with it spe-
cial responsibilities of self-government. The profession has a re-
sponsibility to assure that its regulations are conceived in the
public interest and not in furtherance of parochial or self-
interested concerns of the bar. Every lawyer is responsible for ob-
servance of the rules of professional conduct. A lawyer should also
aid in securing their observance by other lawyers. Neglect of these
responsibilities compromises the independence of the
38. MODEL RULES, supra note 4, Preamble (1998).
39. See KiPNIS, supra note 34, at 9.
40. See id. at 10.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. MODEL RULES, supra note 4, Preamble (1998).
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profession and the public interest which it serves. 44
The preamble to the professional code essentially unites the
concept of professionalism with the idea of responsibility in order
to fulfill the social goals that justify its privileged existence. While
the confluence of professionalism and responsibility is fairly clear,
we need to focus on the legal profession's function to flesh out what
that responsibility is and why it might extend to serving the poor.
C. Lawyers and Justice in the Adversarial System
The business of the legal profession is justice. That notion is
explicit in the profession's ethical codes and implicit in most rheto-
ric that lawyers and others employ concerning the profession.
While lawyers themselves do not actually dispense justice, they
are a key instrument in the legal system by which justice is deliv-
ered. It is important to consider how justice is dispensed in our so-
ciety so we can determine what effects this might have on the legal
profession.
In the United States, most private goods are dispensed by the
free market. These goods are distributed according to peoples'
preferences for a certain item, as measured by the price they are
willing to pay for it. Other goods are distributed by the state for
various reasons. Often these are public goods that the state feels
most people want and need but would otherwise be distributed in-
efficiently without some public role. Other goods are distributed
not according to people's preferences or their right to enjoy them,
but based on someone else's duty to provide them. For example,
parents have a duty to care for their children, including, when
necessary, to seek health care for them, not because children have
some claim on the state for good health, but rather because, in be-
coming parents, they assumed a responsibility to provide the care.
We must ask what sort of good is justice and whether the way
it is delivered creates some sort of duty for anyone to provide it.
Perhaps the most fundamental moral premise of our legal system
is equality before the law. 45 This guarantee means that the same
44. See id.
45. Although this principle is enshrined in the U.S. Constitution in the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, our commitment to this value precedes even consti-
tutional recognition in that it is part of our conception of law itself. See generally
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 382 (1986) ("The Constitution does insist that
each jurisdiction accept the abstract egalitarian principle that people must be
treated as equals, and therefore that each respect some plausible conception of
equality in each of its decisions.
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rules apply to all persons equally regardless of their status. For
such a guarantee to be meaningful, however, all persons who are
to have the law equally applied to them must have equal access to
the system applying it. The opportunity for litigants to enter and
utilize the legal system is a precondition to allowing judges to ob-
jectively apply the law before them. Hence, the promise of equal-
ity before the law depends on the nature and function of the legal
system.
For better or for worse, the United States has committed it-
self to an adversarial system of adjudication. Most lawyers feel
this is a wise choice. 46 Notwithstanding its many virtues, this sys-
tem of adjudication imposes certain burdens. In order to recognize
these burdens, we must recall why we have a system of adjudica-
tion at all. In the abstract, its purpose is to secure justice, but
what does that mean in practice? The answer depends upon one's
conception of justice in the abstract. Among various categories,
the American adversarial system appears to be an example of im-
perfect procedural justice.41 That is to say, there is a clearly iden-
tifiable result that we want to achieve, but the mechanisms for at-
taining that result are imperfect. In all instances, we want trial
litigation to convict parties who are actually guilty and to exoner-
ate innocent parties. The adversarial system creates certain pro-
cedures to secure this end, such as distributing the burden of proof
to prosecutors and plaintiffs, and requiring parties to litigation to
come forth with their own evidence. Nevertheless, the adversarial
system is an imperfect form of justice because it is unable to guar-
antee that those entitled to a certain result actually receive it. De-
spite its limitations, this system is thought to work sufficiently
well that, given the inability to develop any better system, people
accept the results as the best approximation of justice. This acqui-
escence is predicated on the assumption that the system's purpose
and effect is to make it as likely as possible that the jury's finding
of fact and the judge's declaration of the parties' rights will be as
46. For a discussion of the wisdom of this commitment, see LUBAN, supra note
5, at 50-103.
47. For a more detailed discussion of imperfect procedural justice as well as
other forms of justice such as perfect procedural and pure procedural justice, see
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 84-86 (1971). Under a system of pure proce-
dural justice, there is no independent criterion for the right result, but there is a
fair procedure which, if followed, will lead to a fair outcome, whatever it is. See id.
at 86. Under a system of perfect procedural justice, there is not only an independ-
ent criterion for a fair result, but also a procedure which can be devised to give the
desired result. See id. at 85.
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accurate as possible and will be accepted by the litigants as such.
For any system of adjudication to merit our respect, it must
meet the abstract goal of equality before the law. In light of this,
the protection the legal system affords for some must be made
available to all. This imposes two criteria on any legal system.
First, all citizens ought to know the extent of their rights and obli-
gations. This information must be accessible to everybody re-
gardless of their status. Second, all people with legal rights should
be able to exercise them. Legal rights without legal remedies re-
flect a breakdown in the legal system. This malfunction, and the
injustice it inflicts, is compounded when these rights are selec-
tively available to some people because of their economic status.
One aspect of the adversarial system that is both attractive
and problematic is the burden the system places on the parties to
bring, investigate, prepare and present their own cases. The com-
plexity of the legal system necessitates the representation of par-
ties by competent people trained to do so. In the United States,
this means members of the legal profession. Any party without a
lawyer will be at a serious disadvantage in presenting a credible
case. When this occurs, the judicial system may actually perpe-
trate an injustice. If this occurs frequently, the system cannot
claim to be even nearly just.
The adversarial system is only an imperfect form of justice if
the incorrect results it produces are a consequence of inherent pro-
cedural limitations that produce unintended mistakes. For exam-
ple, there will always be people who lie, and it will not always be
posible for the adversarial procedures to ensure that the trier of
fact can discern who is telling the truth. However, if the adver-
sarial procedures of justice are not even available to some people
who have suffered legal wrongs, then the mistakes cannot be said
to result from imperfect procedures but from non-application of
imperfect procedures. The victims of this non-application are not
simply the litigants, or potential litigants, whose legal rights are
not vindicated when, in fact, they are entitled that they be so.
Perhaps more importantly, society's interest in achieving imper-
fect procedural justice is defeated because it still wants people
who, in fact, have legal claims to have them recognized at law.
This non-application of imperfect procedures jeopardizes the
adversarial system's claim to any sort of justice. One might argue
that this incomplete access produces an instance of pure proce-
dural justice because people put their faith in the fairness of the
procedure alone. Apart from the wisdom of placing any faith in
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such incomplete procedures, the adversarial system cannot qualify
for pure procedural justice because there is agreement on the just
end result: that courts in fact decide for those people who in fact
are entitled to prevail according to existing law. So the result can-
not hinge purely on procedure.
One remedy for the present disparity in levels of legal repre-
sentation is to reduce the need for legal counsel. This can be ac-
complished by simplifying the legal system to such a level that, to-
gether with programs of mass education, anyone would be able to
learn the law and represent himself in the judicial system. Unfor-
tunately, this solution is impractical in a modern industrial state
where the complexity of the law reflects the nature of society.
Another solution to the problem of unequal access to the ad-
versarial system is to replace the system with a different manner
of adjudication. One option used in various civil law forums is the
inquisitorial system.48 Under this system of adjudication, judges
take more responsibility for preparing and presenting the case and
for other burdens normally placed on the parties or their lawyers
in the adversarial system. 49 This system eliminates some of the
injustices imposed by unequal legal representation. Nevertheless,
this system, too, has major drawbacks, such as sometimes exces-
sively relying on the government's ability to restrain itself and to
look out for the interests of all sides. This difficult burden is often
insurmountable when the government is itself party to the case.
In this respect, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct's claim
that abuses of legal authority by the government are more readily
kept in check by an independent profession is persuasive. 50 While
this is a good argument against an inquisitorial system of adjudi-
cation, it is also an indictment of uneven representation in an ad-
versarial system because it results in the non-application or mis-
application of even the admittedly imperfect procedures. If an in-
dependent legal profession is necessary to check government ex-
cess in some cases, it is necessary to prevent overreaching in all
circumstances, including situations in which the party cannot af-
ford counsel to actually participate in the adversarial system. In
all circumstances, the harm to the unrepresented party under-
48. For a discussion of the inquisitorial system, see LUBAN, supra note 5, at 93-
103.
49. See id.




mines the legitimacy of the adversarial system. 51
Other solutions to the problem of unequal representation be-
fore the law might include deregulation, or rather, de-
professionalization. Just as shoemakers and aluminum siding
salesmen can promote their wares without invitation or accredita-
tion, so too could "lay" attorneys sell their services on the basis of
caveat emptor. This group of pettifoggers would not be a profes-
sion and so would have no obligation to serve the poor. In this
situation law really would be a business, but it would also be ac-
cessible to a much wider group of people. Breaking the legal pro-
fession's monopoly on the delivery of services would cause prices to
plummet. Unfortunately, the average quality of legal services
would also plunge. But although the quality of such service would
be wildly uneven, it would perhaps be no worse for those people
who now go without representation altogether.
This solution does not appeal, however, to skilled profession-
als with a monopoly on legal services who argue that poor people
would be exposed to charlatons and imcompetents. Yet any advan-
tage afforded by the present system can be justified only if people
who would otherwise be in a worse position if represented by "lay"
lawyers actually get the benefit of a skilled professional. If the
present system forces indigent individuals to forego representation
entirely when contesting people with access to skilled attorneys,
then the poor are worse off under the present system than under
one where nobody has access to skilled legal counsel or they are
represented by only semi-competent attorneys.
Although a deregulated system would lower the standards of
legal representation, that consequence might equalize access to the
adversarial system of adjudication. To the extent this reinforces
equality before the law, it might enhance the legitimacy of the ad-
versarial system. Lowering the standards for everyone in order to
achieve equality is not an attractive option, and is indeed one of
the more powerful objections to programs based on absolute
equality. Nevertheless, the idea of formal equality before the law
is a fundamental component of our legal system, and hence, of our
conception of justice.52 If the present system defeats this basic
goal, creating universal access might be the better alternative.
The good being distributed by the American legal system,
51. See generally LUBAN, supra note 5, at 50-103 (discussing the American ad-
versary system and its role in promoting or impeding justice).
52. See DWORKIN, supra note 45, at 382.
[Vol. 17:171
ETHICAL OBLIGATION
however, is justice, not refrigerators or widgets. Arguments of in-
efficiency, while not irrelevant, are not as crucial as they would be
in the distribution of private goods. Equality is key in the distri-
bution of justice even if the cost is lower levels of efficiency. If the
legal profession finds this choice unacceptable, it must address the
problem of unequal access to skilled representation, since equal
opportunity for justice is the standard by which society judges the
virtue of the present system.
Indeed, one could argue that allocating access to justice as a
private good is actually inefficient and produces market failure. If
one conceives of the adversarial system as a form of imperfect pro-
cedural justice, then when private resource allocation results in
the provision of less justice than everyone agrees they want (i.e.,
legal results that reflect a person's actual legal rights), then that
good is being allocated inefficiently. In this respect, justice is a
classic public good. It is non-excludable in the sense that if one
person's rights are vindicated, everyone benefits by having their
interest in living in a just society preserved. Like most public
goods, however, this benefit to any given person is less than the
cost of providing it. If I hear of potential injustice due to lack of
legal representation, the cost of paying for that person's legal
counsel normally will far exceed my expected loss from diminished
justice. While the "good" of justice would likely exceed the cost to
each person of providing the indigent with legal counsel, it will en-
courage free riders because justice as a good is non-excludable.
Hence, the logic of collective action suggests that, left solely to pri-
vate exchange, the good of justice through the adversarial system
will be purchased in inefficient amounts.
As an alternative to deregulation, we could maintain the pro-
fessional status of lawyers and assign some subset to work for a
government agency designated to provide legal services to the
poor. 53 This is advantageous because it would recognize and ad-
dress the necessity for universal legal representation. This solu-
tion would also address the complaints of many lawyers that pro
bono unfairly burdens them with a responsibility properly carried
by the state. Such an argument is based on the notion that if soci-
ety identifies legal services as an important social value, then soci-
53. One commentator has proposed that lawyers be subject to a draft, much
like our children being subject to mandatory education and our young men to mili-
tary service. See MARKS ET AL., supra note 37, at 291. These drafted lawyers




ety ought to provide the benefit. While flawed, this is not an en-
tirely frivolous argument. In countries with strong welfare state
provisions, professional services such as health care are provided
free of charge to the patients, while doctors are still paid for pro-
viding the services. 54 It is not self-evident that simply because the
needy have a legitimate claim to a service, lawyers, rather than
society, ought to provide it.
This rejoinder, although persuasive in some respects, is self-
defeating. It is true that western industrialized countries with
strong welfare state provisions pay their professionals to treat the
needy, but the price these states extract is their professionals'
autonomy. In Britain and Sweden doctors do not have to donate
their time to the poor because they have become employees of the
National Health Service, subject to the control of the Minister of
Health, with an attendant sacrifice of professional autonomy.
Lawyers might hesitate before ceding all responsibility to the
state, since the price may be their professional autonomy. The
most obvious loss to the profession would be the control it must
abdicate to its government employer in deciding which cases to
bring and how to litigate them. If an independent profession is
needed to prevent government excesses when it is a litigant, this is
equally so when the government is the employer of the litigators.
There is an unfortunate precedent for the government attempting
to abolish and then restrict the Legal Services Corporation by dic-
tating what causes of action it can bring and what legal remedies,
such as those made through class actions, cannot be asserted. 55
This is just the sort of autonomy that a legal professional would
not sacrifice with a paying client and ought not risk through sub-
servience to a government body. Indeed, it is just this autonomy
that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct pledges itself to pro-
tect in its preamble, as a necessary feature of justice in an adver-
sarial system.56 Any attempt to shift the burden of representing
the poor to the government must be reconciled with the profes-
sion's compelling ethical arguments to preserve autonomy from
government control in its other professional endeavors.
54. Countries with such a system include France, Great Britain and Sweden.
55. See, e.g., Legal Services Corp. Kept Alive Temporarily, XXXVII CONG. Q.
ALMANAC 412, 414 (1981) (explaining Congressional action preventing lawyers
from the Legal Services Corporation "from filing any 'class action' suits against
local, state or federal governments" in House Bill, and ultimately removing the
Legal Services Corporation's authorization to provide legal services to the needy in
civil cases).
56. See MODEL RULES, supra note 4, Preamble (1998).
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D. Professional Responsibility and the Adversarial System:
The Obligation to Serve the Poor
The argument so far suggests two conclusions: first, that pro-
fessionalism entails a responsibility to meet the social needs that
justifies professional independence and other privileges; second,
that the adversarial system of adjudication, which underpins our
society's strong interest in justice, only functions when everyone
has a lawyer to represent him or her in that system. Some may
object to placing this obligation on the entire legal profession when
many lawyers never represent clients in any adversarial proceed-
ings. The thrust of this objection is that since many lawyers are
not litigators, and hence have no direct contact with the adversar-
ial system of justice, they incur no reciprocal obligation to engage
in public service. This objection confuses the source of the obliga-
tion, which derives not from the purpose of the profession, justice,
but from the benefit that the profession receives. That benefit, the
monopoly right to give legal advice, serves all lawyers, regardless
of their specialization, since it raises the prices they may charge by
excluding competition. Even though a commercial lawyer giving
tax advice may never intend to go to court, his or her fees will be
higher than if he or she had to compete with tax accountants who
are arguably just as competent.
Indeed, litigating lawyers might wonder why transactional
lawyers, who do not effectuate the principal mission of the profes-
sion by providing access to the court system, enjoy the same bene-
fits that litigating lawyers enjoy. This free-rider effect suggests
that non-litigators actually have a greater public service obligation
since they receive the economic benefits of the monopoly without
providing the compensatory access to justice. This raises the ques-
tion of whether or not all lawyers should enjoy the same monopoly
rights. Certainly the claim for maximal competence is less com-
pelling in areas of legal practice that overlap with various com-
mercial activities.
The scope of this privilege varies in different common law ju-
risdictions. Some countries permit accountants and bankers to
advise on matters that are normally reserved to lawyers in the
United States.57 This matter has been addressed recently in Eng-
land, where the profession is bifurcated, more or less, into litiga-
57. See 16 COMMONWEALTH L. BULL. 555 (1990) (containing the Lord Chancel-
lor's statement on the Courts And Legal Services Bill of 1990).
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tors, called barristers, and non-litigators, called solicitors.58 Al-
though solicitors generally did not appear in court, they enjoyed a
monopoly privilege to engage in many activities, such as land con-
veyancing, which could have been accomplished by other groups. 59
These services often provided the bulk of a solicitor's income. 60
Nevertheless, this privilege has recently been narrowed so that,
for example, banks may now perform some of the conveyancing
services formerly provided exclusively by lawyers. 61
Non-litigating lawyers might respond that their activities do
advance the cause of justice since, even though they do not repre-
sent clients in court, they advise them about legal issues which
further their legal rights. The claim that non-litigating lawyers
help serve justice by acting at the penumbra of the adversarial
system is compelling. Nevertheless, it also suggests that, as part
of this larger system, they assume the obligations of the profes-
sion. This does not mean that transactional lawyers must fulfill
their obligations by representing indigent clients in the courtroom.
Just as monopoly privileges can be justified by non-litigating ac-
tivities, so too can public service obligations be fulfilled by any of
the entire range of legal services lawyers are qualified to provide.
As the legal profession states in its own model rules of profes-
sional conduct, lawyers are the guardians of law. 62 The social goal
they are pledged to serve is justice in our adversarial system. 63
Hence, their specific professional duty, among others they may
have, is to ensure that everyone has legal representation. This
duty is clearly recognized by the profession itself, which states in
its Model Rules of Professional Conduct that "[a] lawyer should be
mindful of deficiencies in the administration of justice and of the
fact that the poor, and sometimes persons who are not poor, cannot
afford adequate legal assistance, and should therefore devote pro-
fessional time and civic influence in their behalf."64 Through this
and other statements, the collective body responsible for enforcing
professional obligations has unequivocally acknowledged the duty





62. See MODEL RULES, supra note 4, Preamble (1998).
63. See id. (stating that "[a] lawyer is a ... public citizen having special respon-




tion who go without legal representation due to lack of funds 65
suggest a failure by the profession to fulfill its ethical duty.
Does this mean that the Model Rules' statements are empty
rhetoric, platitudes designed to obscure the privileges of a profit-
able enterprise? This obligation to serve the poor does not derive
from any promise made by the legal profession. The duty to serve
the poor would exist even if the professional rules did not ac-
knowledge it. Nonetheless, the rules' repeated declarations do
have an effect on professional obligation since this frequent asser-
tion, without rebuttal, has created reliance on the part of society
that this promise should be fulfilled. This may not be an unen-
forceable gratuitous promise. Under the equitable doctrine of
promissory estoppel, if it is made clear to the legal profession that
society has relied to its detriment in return for the profession's
promise to fulfill its responsibilities, then a binding obligation
could be created. This is the same reliance that describes the so-
cial contract that society makes with any professional body. That
is, in return for giving lawyers the privilege of an unregulated mo-
nopoly, society extracts the pledge that the constitutive goal of
that profession will be delivered. 66 These professional benefits are
not guaranteed by the Constitution. The government can decide
the appropriate trade-off which it will demand in return for its
grant. An obvious example is the communications industry. The
government grants valuable licenses to radio and television sta-
tions in return for the obligation that the stations devote a par-
ticular amount of otherwise profitable air time to public service.67
The legal profession has similarly received something quite
valuable in return for its public service duty. The legal profession
has a largely unregulated monopoly on the delivery of legal serv-
ices. While lack of competition is a great benefit to the monopolist,
the absence of a free market is costly to society. Goods delivered
by a monopolist are generally delivered more inefficiently-at
higher costs and lower quality-than those goods subject to compe-
tition. For these and other reasons, monopolies are generally
against public policy. 68
65. See Derek C. Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training, 33 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 570, 570-71 (1983).
66. See generally MARKS ET AL., supra note 37, at 273-93 (discussing economic
burdens associated with public interest work and the concept that the practice of
law is a public utility).
67. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 307-08 (1998).
68. It would be hard to argue that the legal profession is a natural monopoly in
an age when even water and other utility companies are competing for customers.
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Sometimes it is necessary to endure monopolies to achieve an
important public purpose. The most common state-sanctioned
monopolists are public utilities. In return for the benefits con-
ferred on the sanctioned monopoly, society demands performance
of the public purpose for which the monopoly was created. One
purpose for which public utilities are created is to serve the entire
public, even when a purely private corporation might decide that it
was not profitable to do so. Nonetheless, public utilities, although
regulated, are usually intended to be profit-making institutions.
Therefore, the idea that an institution wants to make money is not
inconsistent with having obligations that will reduce its capacity to
do so.
6 9
Lawyers are, of course, free to make money. Their status,
however, as a profession is analogous to that of a public utility,
with the exception that they have the added benefit of retaining
their independence. This autonomy, unique to professional mo-
nopolies, increases its public service obligations. Without this
reciprocity it would make no sense for society to allocate a valuable
monopoly to the legal profession. Society would never grant an
electric utility a monopoly if it pledged to serve only wealthy cor-
porations who could afford high rates. Since this exclusive right
raises the costs of providing the service, some pledge to reach the
entire community must be made. This commitment entails sacri-
fice on the part of the monopolists because, absent this assurance,
society would not tolerate the costs of monopoly. Likewise, law-
yers, the self-proclaimed guardians of the law and the public util-
ity in charge of delivering legal services, also must serve the entire
community. While a regulated public utility would be required by
the appropriate government agency to do this, a professional body
is autonomous. This autonomy, far from relieving lawyers of the
public service requirement, merely shifts it to the profession's own
code of ethics. Because lawyers provide access to justice, their
duty translates into working to ensure access to this service. In a
system such as ours where only attorneys have authority to pro-
vide legal assistance, the legal profession fails to discharge its duty
as an unregulated public utility unless it works to provide mecha-
nisms for the delivery of legal services to the poor.
69. See generally VALUES IN THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY (Kenneth Sayre,
ed., 1977) (discussing the United State's increased consumption of power).
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E. Professional Obligations: Their Nature and Effect
The idea that ethical responsibilities are somehow voluntary
is a common misconception prevailing in some parts of the legal
profession. This approach appears to divide responsibilities into
different species with different degrees of obligation, some volun-
tary and others mandatory.70 This conception completely miscon-
strues the nature of obligation. All obligations, by definition,
oblige unless they are overridden by more important duties.71 Ob-
ligations can differ by their source and importance, but their
status alone does not impair the duty to discharge them. An obli-
gation entails a duty to act or to refrain from acting.
Sometimes the source of the duty is legal while other times it
is moral.72 Since legal obligations are backed by the force of the
state, disobedience incurs the possibility of sanctions. Purely
moral obligations do not risk state sanctions, although, from the
believer's perspective, the sanctions for disobedience of one's re-
ligious obligations are infinitely worse. The lack of state or divine
sanctions does not excuse performance of ethical obligations or
make them voluntary.
The only justification for violating an obligation arises when
a more significant, irreconcilable, obligation or duty trumps it.
Sometimes obligations of law clash with moral obligations, and
moral and legal obligations of different significance can conflict
with each other. When this occurs it may be necessary to violate
one obligation in order to fulfill another, more important one. In
these circumstances one must weigh the magnitude of each obliga-
tion and perform the one of greater importance. That is the only
excuse for not fulfilling an obligation. For example, even though
one is obliged to keep one's promises, a father's duty to take his
injured child to the emergency room overrides his prior promise to
go fishing with his neighbor.
70. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 4, Rule 6.1 (1998) (characterizing ethi-
cal responsibility as voluntary).
71. For discussions of the nature of obligation and its relation to law and mo-
rality, see STUART HAMPSHIRE, MORALITY AND CONFLICT (1981); JOSEPH RAZ, THE
AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY (1979); Kent Greenawalt, The
Natural Duty to Obey the Law, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1985); Philip Soper, The Moral
Value of Law, 84 MICH. L. REV. 63 (1985).
72. The connection between law and morals is a terribly complex issue in legal
philosophy which this paper will not address. For the purposes of the present dis-
cussion it is irrelevant whether the law is morally correct since, with regard to the
issue of public service, the law and morals do not conflict. For a comprehensive
discussion of these issues, see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
(1977); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1960).
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Lawyers have no obligations that clash with their profes-
sional ethical obligation to make sure that the adversarial system
delivers justice equally. While lawyers may honorably profit from
their profession, there is no professional duty, no legal duty, no re-
ligious duty, and no moral duty to make the maximal amount of
money one is capable of earning. Indeed, there is no duty that con-
flicts with their professional obligation to serve the poor. Since
this obligation has not been overridden by more important duties
or obligations, lawyers ethically must discharge this professional
obligation. 73
This confusion over the nature and status of ethical obliga-
tions has been reinforced by the unfortunate nomenclature and
categorization utilized in various legal codes of professional re-
sponsibility. For example, the 1969 ABA Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility divided obligations into those that were
mandatory, and hence exposed an attorney to disciplinary actions
for failure to obey, and those which were merely ethical, and hence
were just goals towards which the profession should, but need not,
aim. 74 The former were called Disciplinary Rules while the latter
were just Ethical Considerations.75 This distinction is fallacious
because it implies that we can have obligations that are voluntary.
Indeed, the notion of voluntary obligations is an oxymoron.76 The
Code's distinction essentially denies that ethical considerations are
professional obligations. It is uncertain whether the profession
has the authority to make this determination. Although the pro-
fession's rhetoric reinforces its public service duty, the obligation
to fulfill it stems from the nature of professionalism and the adver-
sarial system in the United States.
The professional obligation to serve the poor has also been
recognized in various state and federal decisions. 77 Some lawyers
deny this, noting that the right to counsel recognized in Gideon v.
Wainwright78 has not been extended to indigent parties in civil
73. See Michael Davis, The Moral Authority of a Professional Code, in Nomos
29 AUTHORITY REVISITED 302, 302-37 (J. Roland Pennock & John Chapman eds.,
1987) (discussing the moral basis of the professional code of ethics).
74. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969).
75. See id.
76. While one can take on ethical obligations voluntarily, as when someone
promises to do something, once they are assumed one does not have the discretion
to disobey them unless they are trumped by higher obligations.
77. See, e.g., Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296,
310 (1989) (stating, in dicta, that lawyers have an ethical obligation to serve the
poor).
78. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that an indigent defendant in a criminal
prosecution has a right to counsel).
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cases. This objection confuses a party's right to counsel with the
powers of the judiciary and the duties of the lawyer. While parties
may have no individual legal right to counsel in civil cases, this
does not mean that a lawyer does not have an ethical duty to serve
the poor or that a judge does not have the power to enforce it. Be-
cause ethical obligations, as we now understand, are mandatory
unless trumped by more important ethical obligations, lawyers
must ensure that everyone has access to the adversarial system of
justice.
To whom is this duty owed? There are several candidates
who might be the beneficiary of this obligation. Some might say
the duty is owed, in the first instance, to the court as the body that
administers the judicial system through which justice is achieved.
Unfortunately, the power of the court to enforce this duty has re-
cently been questioned in Mallard v. U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Iowa,79 where the Supreme Court decided that
28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) did not permit a federal court to command a
reluctant attorney to represent a poor litigant in a civil case.80 Yet,
despite the Court's unwillingness to construe the power to request
as the power to compel, it reaffirmed that, apart from this statute,
the ethical obligation of attorneys to volunteer their time to serve
the poor remained manifest.8 1 Moreover, the court left open the
question of whether the federal courts have inherent power to
compel lawyers to meet their obligation. The court refrained from
considering this issue since the district court below had not in-
voked such authority.8 2
Even if the federal courts could not enforce the professional
obligation to serve the poor, lawyers would still not be excused
from discharging their own responsibilities. Otherwise one would
have to believe that only those duties backed by sanctions are
mandatory. This is not the case. While the likelihood that an ob-
ligation will be executed may be enhanced when it is backed by
prosecution has a right to counsel).
79. 490 U.S. 296 (1989).
80. See id. at 296. The relevant section of the statute states: "Itihe court may
request an attorney to represent any person unable to employ counsel . 28
U.S.C.A. § 1915(d) (1998).
81. See Mallard, 490 U.S. at 308.
82. See id. Other jurisdictions have recognized an inherent discretionary
power for the court to appoint counsel to the indigent and a concomitant obligation
of lawyers to accept such assignment based on their professional ethical obliga-
tions. But see In re Smiley, 330 N.E.2d 53, 55 (N.Y. 1975) ("[Tlhere is no power in
the courts to direct the provision of counsel or to require the compensation of re-
tained counsel for the indigent wives [in divorce actions] out of public funds.").
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sanctions, the authority of that obligation is independent of such
measures. The lack of rigorous sanctions may explain why so
many lawyers are tempted to evade their professional obligations
to serve the poor. This is especially regrettable in light of the legal
profession's self-proclaimed status as guardians of the law. Noth-
ing would so undermine the rule of law as the belief that one's ob-
ligation to obey is contingent upon the probability of enforcement.
A commitment to the rule of law means that one obeys it for its
own sake and not simply because one is afraid of sanctions. Law-
yers ought to know this better than anyone and thus should not
need sanctions to motivate compliance with their professional
ethical obligations.
Notwithstanding the duty owed to the court, society as a
whole can claim to be the beneficiary of the professional duty to
serve the poor. It can make this claim in return for the monopoly
privilege conferred on the legal profession and because our system
of adjudication, over which lawyers claim guardianship, could not
otherwise be considered just. So long as lawyers continue to de-
fend the adversarial system and their exclusive access to it, they
must seek to make that system work for everyone, including those
who cannot afford representation. Equal justice is a more funda-
mental principle in the American system of justice than represen-
tation by a professional body of private lawyers. Although the le-
gal profession can plausibly claim to enhance equal protection in
many ways, there is no doubt that, in one very important manner,
the existing arrangement is an obstacle to justice. The need for
money to hire a lawyer in the present system indisputably pre-
vents a large segment of the population from vindicating its legal
rights.83 This injustice is a direct consequence of the present
structure for the distribution of legal services. If we must sacrifice
either equal protection under the law or an unregulated legal mo-
nopoly, equality before the law should be the more important ideal.
These two principles could easily be reconciled if the legal profes-
sion fulfilled its obligation to serve the poor.8 4
83. See Bok, supra note 65, at 570-71.
84. But cf. Stephen Ellmann, Lawyering for Justice in a Flowed Democracy, 90
COLUM. L. REv. 116 (1990); David Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to
Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 735 (1980) (suggesting that no obligation of volunteer
work should be imposed on the bar and that lawyers' contributions should mainly




Professionals do not have a right to practice. The practice of
law, as with any professional monopoly, is a privilege conferred by
the state on those groups who serve its interests in a manner it
chooses. Lawyers are given the privileges of their profession be-
cause they promote the larger social value of justice. The funda-
mental premise of justice in American society consists in equality
before the law. This requires every person to have the same rights
under the law and an equal opportunity to assert them. The legal
profession's promotion of this social value justifies its privileges
and its particularistic ethical behavior. It is inconsistent to simul-
taneously maintain all of the following propositions: that lawyers
ought to have monopoly control over the provision of legal services;
that lawyers are necessary in order for people to receive appropri-
ate representation of their legal rights; that lawyers have a profes-
sional obligation to promote justice in return for their monopoly
privilege; and that lawyers have no professional duty to serve the
poor.
The argument that lawyers ought not be obligated to donate
what other groups need is not without merit. However, all profes-
sionals, including lawyers, have particular role-related obligations
to perform in return for the privilege of maintaining a monopoly
control of a public good. Each monopoly is tolerated to the extent
that it successfully promotes its designated social good. Whether
or not other people, including society at large, may also have an
obligation to provide the poor with legal service does not discharge
the obligation of attorneys to fulfill their own professional respon-
sibilities.
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